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RESPONSE

SECTION 2 IS DEAD: LONG LIVE SECTION 2

Guy-Uriel E. Charles

†

In response to Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of
Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U.
PA . L. R EV. 377 (2012).
Voting rights law is in the midst of an existential crisis. The Voting
Rights Act (VRA) is probably the most celebrated civil rights statute
1
ever enacted by Congress. By most accounts, the central concern that
gave rise to the VRA—racial animus against black voters and black
candidates by white state and private actors—has, blessedly, retreated
2
into the annals of history since the Act’s passage. Bull Connor is
dead; black voters can register and vote on par with white voters; black
candidates can run for office, and white voters will vote for them; the
voting rights framework now incorporates Latinos and other Americans of color, allowing more individuals to take advantage of the pro†

Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to Christopher
Elmendorf and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer.
1
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2006)).
2
See Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 C ALIF. L.
R EV. 1589, 1591 (2004) (describing the success of the VRA in ensuring minority access
to the polls and increasing minority representation in legislatures); Richard H. Pildes,
Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80
N.C. L. R EV. 1517, 1529-39 (2002) (reviewing social-science studies that found an
increasing prevalence of white voters supporting black political candidates); Michael J.
Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 D ENV. U. L. R EV.
225, 249 (2003) (explaining how the diminished level of purposeful discrimination
may make an extension of Section 5 unconstitutional).
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tections of the VRA; and a black man is President of the United States.
Though isolated instances of racial animus in voting persist, and may
be with us always, the VRA has replaced the systematic, state-sponsored
racial exclusion that affected the rights of millions of American citizens seeking to participate in the political process with a new reality.
Literacy tests are no more, at least as a feature of the electoral process;
grandfather clauses are buried with the grandfathers; retaliation by
private employers against black voters who dared to register to vote
exists only in our memories, if at all; and few twenty-first century
Americans could imagine that anyone would assault a voter or group
of voters for exercising their right to vote, much less that the state
would fail to prosecute such an attacker. The question then is what
steps remain for voting rights policy.
Voting rights law, doctrine, practice, and, pointedly, scholarship
have been unable to figure out the next move. Some scholars argue
3
that it is time to sunset the VRA. Others have proposed new alterna4
tives and modifications. The Supreme Court has threatened to strike
5
down one of the Act’s most central provisions, Section 5, on constitu6
tional grounds, while commentators—including some Justices on the
Supreme Court—have argued that the VRA’s other central provision,
7
8
Section 2, is unconstitutional. No sophisticated student of voting
3

Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?,
104 C OLUM . L. R EV. 1710, 1731 (2004).
4
See Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In
Approach, 106 C OLUM . L. R EV. 708, 716 (2006) (proposing an “opt-in” system that
would “create space for community and legislative leaders to negotiate the best deal
possible for racial minorities but place a bargaining chip in their pockets—a chance to
demand that the Act’s traditional constraints apply should bargaining break down”).
5
VRA § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006) (subjecting to review any attempt to change
“any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting” in defined jurisdictions).
6
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504,
2513 (2009) (suggesting that the VRA is unconstitutional, but finding alternative
grounds for the holding).
7
VRA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006) (prohibiting any voting qualification or prerequisite that discriminates on the basis of race or color).
8
See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1250 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(reiterating his position from his concurring opinion in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,
891 (1994), that Section 2 of the VRA does not authorize vote dilution claims, and
suggesting that such an interpretation makes the statute unconstitutional); Georgia v.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (considering it a “fundamental flaw” that “the Department of Justice is permitted or directed to encourage
or ratify a course of unconstitutional conduct in order to find compliance with a statutory directive”); cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S.
399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning
the court’s role in “rejiggering the district lines under § 2”).
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rights would be surprised if the Court were to strike down Section 2 or
Section 5 as unconstitutional within the next two to five years.
Leaving aside the constitutional questions—which may ultimately
be fatal to the Act—the policy questions are equally pressing. What
does vote dilution mean in a political context in which the vast majority of African-American voters—and increasingly Latinos—support the
Democratic Party? What does racial bloc voting mean when black voters are unwilling to vote for black Republican candidates but some
white voters will vote for the Republican candidate regardless of race?
Is it racial discrimination if a Republican state legislature adopts a voter identification requirement when the law will likely have a disproportionate impact on the state’s Democratic voters, a plurality of
whom would be voters of color? Is such a voter identification requirement a barrier to political participation and thus a violation of
Section 2? When should a state’s failure to draw coalition and influence districts be a violation of Section 2? Why are felon disenfranchisement statutes consistent with Section 2?
What is the
constitutional expiration date on Section 2’s results test? These are
just a small sample of the types of questions raised by voting rights
policy that are not only currently unanswered, but that we do not
seem to know how to answer.
In Making Sense of Section 2, Christopher Elmendorf tackles some of
these problems head-on. Professor Elmendorf’s purpose is to resurrect and save Section 2. In particular, he focuses on three criticisms
that judges, practitioners, and academics have lodged against Section
2. They have argued that Section 2’s standard is difficult to apply, that
remedies for violations of Section 2 will contribute to racial balkanization, and that Section 2 is unconstitutional.
Professor Elmendorf makes a number of moves in his article. First,
he ascribes to the VRA and Section 2 the purpose of quickening the
9
“waning of racism in American politics.” Second, he argues that Section 2 “should be understood as a delegation of authority to the courts
to develop a common law of racially fair elections, guided by certain
substantive and evidentiary norms as well as norms about legal
10
change.” Third, Professor Elmendorf reorients Section 2’s substan11
tive standard from the factors set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles and the
9

Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA . L. R EV. 377, 381 (2012).
10
Id. at 383.
11
478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (finding that the plaintiff must show that a group is
“sufficiently large and geographically compact”; that it is “politically cohesive”; and that
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totality of circumstances approach rooted in Section 2’s legislative his12
tory to a focus on “race-biased decisionmaking.” He defines “racebiased decisionmaking” as an electoral decision that was affected by
13
the decisionmaker’s consideration of the subject’s race. This substantive standard would cover both dilution claims and participation
claims. Finally, Professor Elmendorf offers two particularly innovative
applications of this new substantive Section 2 standard. Section 2,
Professor Elmendorf argues, should be used to respond “to the problem of election outcomes that are unconstitutional because of the role
14
of race in the electorate’s verdict.” Given that these types of claims
would not be justiciable under the Court’s political question doctrine,
15
the Court can address those claims under a statutory framework.
Presumably, these are claims where white (or black) voters refuse to
vote for a black candidate (or white candidate in the case of black
voters) because of the candidate’s race. Section 2 would also address
“depolarization claims,” which Professor Elemendorf defines as
claims alleging that an electoral structure has “unreasonably in16
duce[d] or sustain[ed] race-biased voting.”
There is much to admire about Making Sense of Section 2. I think
Professor Elemendorf is clearly right that courts should interpret Section 2 in the same way that they develop the common law. It is not
surprising that I would take this view given that Professor Luis Fuentes17
Rohwer and I have advanced a similar and broader argument. In
our view, the Court has interpreted the VRA consistent with a common law approach and in partnership with both Congress and, to a
more limited extent, the Department of Justice. One cannot fully appreciate the development and evolution of voting rights policy without
understanding how those three institutions have interacted together to
give effect to the often-shared, at least at the outset, constitutional vision
of the Fifteenth Amendment and the statutory aspirations of the VRA.
But this common law approach has its limits, and in this regard,
Making Sense of Section 2 raises as many questions as it answers, as a
good article should. Voting rights policy’s existential crisis is due in
a white majority generally votes as a bloc, which overcomes the minority group’s preferred candidate).
12
Elmendorf, supra note 9, at 383.
13
Id. at 384.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 414-15.
16
Id. at 385.
17
See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Superstatutory Interpretation
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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large part to its failure to come to terms with the purpose of voting
rights law in the twenty-first century. Professor Elmendorf squares up
to this problem by recognizing a supposed consensus with respect to
the purpose of Section 2 between both liberals and conservatives on
the Court. Section 2’s purpose, and maybe that of the VRA more
broadly, is to reduce if not eliminate racism in American politics. But
this move is question-begging: what is racism in American politics,
and how will we know whether it is waning? Resolving that inquiry is a
necessary condition to rehabilitating Section 2. Without an adequate
conceptual understanding of the racism that Section 2 ought not to
tolerate in the political process, it is hard to evaluate Professor
Elmendorf’s innovative and important contributions to Section 2’s
future development, namely: (1) his introduction of race-biased decisionmaking as the substantive standard under Section 2; (2) his focus
on unconstitutional outcomes to justify and guide the constitutional
scope of Section 2; and (3) the relevance of depolarization claims under this new understanding of Section 2.
Is the telos of Section 2 the removal of Jim Crow–like barriers to political participation? If the racism is defined as or limited to racial animus, then the conservatives are right that there is nothing left for
voting rights policy to vindicate. The Voting Rights Act has largely
achieved this purpose, and Section 2 should only be preserved in the
annals of history. Relatedly and more specific to Professor Elmendorf’s project, if racial animus is the evil that Section 2 is seeking to
eradicate, then it is not clear what the introduction of “race-biased
decisionmaking” would add to the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment standards and whether depolarization claims would be any different from ordinary Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims.
Again, the inevitable conclusion, at least under this understanding of
racism as Jim Crow, is that there is nothing left for Section 2 to do.
If race-biased and depolarizing claims are not aimed at Jim Crow–
style racial animus in the political process, then what types of racetinged political behavior would implicate Section 2’s substantive
standard? Professor Elmendorf suggests “prejudiced voting by majoritygroup citizens causes a participation harm within the meaning of Section 2 whenever it burdens minorities’ efforts to participate in normal
18
party politics.” But Making Sense of Section 2 does not define prejudice or its conceptual complement, normal politics. If we discard Jim
Crow–type prejudice as a possibility, then the next best doctrinal op18

Elmendorf, supra note 9, at 420.
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tion is a disparate impact standard. We could, for example, rewrite
the sentence above to say that “whenever a majority votes as a bloc to
defeat the minority’s preferred candidate, minority voters suffer a
participation harm within the meaning of Section 2.” But of course
this is the Gingles standard, which Making Sense of Section 2 rejects explicitly and maybe rightly so.
For a slightly different perspective, one could borrow an interpretation of the Court’s decision in League of United Latin American Citizens
19
v. Perry (LULAC) to reconstitute a workable intent standard. In LULAC, Latino plaintiffs argued that Texas violated Section 2 of the VRA
when it removed some Latino voters from a district in order to prevent
20
Latinos as a group from voting out the incumbent representative. In
his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy not only agreed with the
Section 2 claim, but he also implied, rather strongly, that the state’s
action might constitute intentional discrimination in violation of the
21
Equal Protection Clause. Though it is hard to parse this cryptic argument, and though it might mean nothing more than a reiteration
22
of the classical intent standard, it might also mean that Justice Kennedy is amenable to a redefinition of the intent standard in order to
23
reach certain types of voting rights violations. If this is true, then it
would mean that the state engages in intentional race discrimination
in the electoral process when its actions burden voters (of color? numerical minorities? incipient political majorities?) and that the state
does not have a compelling justification for imposing that intentional
burden. The difference, of course, between this redefinition and classical equal protection doctrine is that classical equal protection doctrine does not apply heightened scrutiny unless the state burdened
24
voters of color because of their race.
Under this redefinition, it
might not matter whether the voters burdened are voters of color,
and it certainly does not matter that race was not the reason for imposing the burden. Again, it is not clear whether this is a robust line
of inquiry, but it would have been an interesting one for Professor
Elmendorf to explore.

19

548 U.S. 399 (2006).
Id. at 423-25.
21
Id. at 440.
22
See Ellen D. Katz, Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1171 (2007) (concluding, however, that the LULAC opinion does more than reiterate the intent standard).
23
For a preliminary attempt at this redefinition, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 O HIO S T. L.J. 1185, 1207-10 (2007).
24
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976).
20
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Moreover, this line of inquiry—redefining the intent standard toward the aperture opened up by Justice Kennedy in LULAC—is congruent with another one of Professor Elmendorf’s important aims,
which is to shore up the constitutionality of Section 2. Professor
Elmendorf tackles that task by offering a series of arguments that
build on each other but, like a game of Jenga, become more precarious as each block is added to the tower. The first move is the argu25
ment that voters, as a collective, are state actors. According to this
argument, voters are an “it” and not a “they,” and as an “it,” their collective behavior constitutes state action. Professor Elmendorf argues
next that election outcomes are unconstitutional when they are the
26
product of “race-biased voting.” Presumably, this means that it is
unconstitutional for white voters to elect, for example, a white representative because these voters prefer the white representative to a hypothetical black challenger on racial grounds. At the same time, ProProfessor Elmendorf argues that each voter’s individual decision—and
by hypothesis, racist decision—is constitutionally protected but that
the aggregation of those decisions constitutes state action and violates
27
the Constitution.
Professor Elmendorf next concedes that even
though the electoral outcome is state action, it would not be justicia28
ble because of the lack of remedy for the constitutional violation.
From this rather unstable tower of reasoning, Professor Elmendorf
derives two implications. First, the Court should interpret its constitutional standard for assessing Congress’s power to promulgate Section
2 in light of the fact that Section 2 is attempting to reach constitution29
al violations that would not be justiciable under the Constitution.
Second, Section 2 ought to recognize “depolarization claims,” which
manifest themselves where the electoral structure promotes or facili30
tates race-biased electoral behavior. Under Professor Elmendorf’s
framework, depolarization claims under Section 2 would make up for
the fact that the unconstitutional outcome cases are not justiciable.
Functionally, these depolarization claims would replace the Gingles or
totality of circumstances standard.
The problem with this framework is that intellectually it is quite
fragile. First, one has to buy into the distinction between the right to

25

Elmendorf, supra note 9, at 430-32.
Id. at 430.
27
Id. at 432.
28
Id. at 437-38.
29
Id. at 441-42.
30
Id. at 442.
26
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vote as an individual right and as an aggregate right. Second, one has
to agree that the individual right is protected by the First Amendment,
but the aggregate right is not. Third, and this is a familiar refrain, one
would have to distinguish between instances where voters prefer a
candidate for benign reasons and where voters prefer a candidate on
the basis of race for malign reasons. Fourth and finally, one would
have to agree that the Fourteenth Amendment is relevant to electoral
outcomes. Each of these moves is deeply contested in election law
31
scholarship, to put it mildly. In my view, they are also unnecessary
for Professor Elmendorf’s conclusion.
From an altogether different vantage point, one could argue that
the telos of voting rights policy is to ensure consequential political participation by voters of color. Put differently, maybe voting rights
scholars need to articulate a right of political participation that is unmoored to any conception of racial discrimination. It is a small step
from Professor Elmendorf’s concept of depolarization to a normative
argument that electoral structures should not submerge completely
32
the rights of racial minorities. This might kill the current Section 2
framework, but we might have to kill Section 2 to save it.
Conceptually, I am increasingly attracted to a universal, as opposed
to race-based, approach to thinking about electoral inequality. But a
right of consequential political participation for voters of color may
paradoxically be a critical way station. That is, in the process of universalizing voting rights policy, one can begin by articulating a right of
consequential political participation based upon race, while recognizing that this is not the ultimate limitation of the right. If it is possible
33
to reason out from race, and even if it is not, then one might move
voting rights policy toward removing barriers to political participation,
even if those barriers do not have a disparate racial impact.

31

See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First
Amendment Right of Association, 91 C ALIF. L. R EV. 1209, 1279 (2003) (“The state’s purpose should not be to try to remove race as a factor in American politics; instead, this
choice should be left to individuals.”); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an
Undiluted Vote, 114 H ARV. L. R EV. 1663, 1718 (2001) (cautioning against fitting aggregate rights into the “conventional individual rights framework”); Pamela S. Karlan, The
Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism about Formalism, 71 T EX . L. R EV. 1705, 1707-08 (1993)
(explaining the aggregate components of the right to vote).
32
See generally L ANI G UINIER , T HE T YRANNY OF THE M AJORITY: F UNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN R EPRESENTATIVE D EMOCRACY (1994).
33
This is not an insignificant hurdle, if the Court’s experience in Vieth v. Jubelirer is
at all instructive. See 541 U.S. 267, 284-87 (2003) (noting that the Court’s experience
with racial gerrymandering is irrelevant in the context of partisan gerrymandering).
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Professor Elemendorf’s article is a thoughtful and learned exposition on what ails Section 2 of the VRA specifically, but captures much
of the VRA more generally. It is bold in its solutions and rich in its
details. He not only helps us understand how to make sense of Section 2, but also that we might have to kill Section 2 in order to save it.
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